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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-2486 
_____________ 
 
MALIK MACK, 
 
               Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 SUPERINTENDENT MAHANOY SCI; 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; 
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF MONTGOMERY 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 2-15-cv-01829) 
District Judge:  Hon. Gerald J. Pappert 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 6, 2017 
 
Before:   JORDAN, HARDIMAN, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 9, 2017) 
 _______________ 
 
OPINION* 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Malik Mack, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, appeals the District Court order 
dismissing his petition for habeas corpus as procedurally defaulted.  Mack contends that 
the default of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is excused pursuant to Martinez 
v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012).  We granted Mack’s application for a certificate of 
appealability “as to whether the District Court erred in concluding that he is procedurally 
barred from pursuing his claim that plea counsel was ineffective [because] [r]easonable 
jurists could debate whether Martinez ...  excuses the default of this claim, and whether 
the claim has merit.”  (App. at 21.)  The government concedes that Martinez may excuse 
Mack’s default.  We too agree that Martinez applies and may excuse Mack’s default, and 
we will therefore vacate the District Court’s order dismissing Mack’s petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus and remand to the District Court with instructions to conduct the 
analysis that Martinez requires. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 Mack pleaded guilty in the Court of Common Pleas in Montgomery County, 
Pennsylvania, to one count of third-degree murder and one count of aggravated assault.  
The state court sentenced Mack to sixteen-and-one-half to thirty-five years of 
imprisonment.  He did not file a direct appeal.   
 Later, Mack filed a pro se petition for collateral review under Pennsylvania’s Post 
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541, et seq., and the PCRA court 
appointed new counsel for him.  Mack’s PCRA counsel filed a no-merit letter pursuant to 
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (en banc), seeking to 
withdraw from representing Mack.  The court granted the withdrawal and issued a notice 
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of its intent to dismiss Mack’s PCRA petition without a hearing.  Mack filed a pro se 
response but did not raise a claim that plea counsel had been ineffective.  The court then 
dismissed Mack’s PCRA petition without a hearing.  The Pennsylvania Superior Court 
affirmed the dismissal, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal.   
 Mack timely filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  At that point, he claimed 
that his “[p]lea counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately 
investigate medical and factual state-of-mind evidence; and failed to inform [Mack] that 
such evidence would be essential in properly determining guilt; this failure caused 
[Mack] to unintelligently, unknowingly and involuntarily plead guilty.”  (App. at 122.) 
 A Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation concluding that Mack’s 
habeas claim was procedurally barred and that Mack could not avoid the bar by relying 
on Martinez.  The Report and Recommendation reasoned that, “after PCRA counsel was 
permitted to withdraw, petitioner could have preserved the instant claim by raising it in 
petitioner’s response to the notice of intention to dismiss PCRA petition, which petitioner 
failed to do.  [Martinez] does not excuse petitioner’s failure to raise a claim on collateral 
appeal.”  (App. at 8-9.)  The District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation in 
full and dismissed Mack’s habeas petition.   
 Mack has appealed that dismissal, arguing that the District Court erred by 
concluding that Martinez was inapplicable and by not conducting the analysis called for 
by Martinez. 
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II. DISCUSSION1 
 
We normally cannot review a state prisoner’s petition for habeas corpus when the 
prisoner’s federal claim has been procedurally defaulted.  Coleman v. Thompson, 501 
U.S. 722, 750 (1991).  A procedural default occurs when an independent and adequate 
state procedural rule bars state courts from considering the claim.  Id.  But we can excuse 
the default and review the claim if the prisoner can show cause and prejudice.  Id. 
Although cause typically cannot be established by showing ineffective assistance 
of counsel in state collateral proceedings, id. at 752, the Supreme Court announced a 
narrow exception to that rule in Martinez, 566 U.S. at 9.  It said, “a procedural default 
will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective 
assistance at trial if, in [an] initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or 
counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.”  Id. at 17.  The rule in Martinez will serve to 
establish cause when “three conditions are met: (a) the default was caused by ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel or the absence of counsel (b) in the initial-review 
collateral proceeding ... and (c) the underlying claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness is 
‘substantial,’ meaning ‘the claim has some merit[.]’”  Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 119 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (quoting Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14). 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  We exercise plenary review over a district 
court’s dismissal of a habeas petition when the district court did not grant an evidentiary 
hearing.  Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 50 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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Importantly, our inquiry focuses on whether counsel, not the prisoner, raised the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim at the initial-review collateral proceeding.  See id.  
(explaining that Martinez may apply when ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel or absence of counsel caused the default).  Indeed, we recently emphasized in 
Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI that, under Pennsylvania law, raising a claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel is the responsibility of PCRA counsel.  856 F.3d 
230, 243 (3d Cir. 2017).  Because that responsibility rests with PCRA counsel, we have 
applied Martinez to excuse a procedural default when such counsel has failed to raise an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Id. at 243-44. 
Here, neither the Magistrate Judge nor the District Court conducted the analysis 
that Martinez requires.  The Report and Recommendation’s reasoning – that Martinez did 
not apply because Mack could have raised the issue in his pro se filing in the PCRA court 
– is inconsistent with Martinez itself. 
In Martinez, a prisoner’s appellate attorney filed a statement that the prisoner 
lacked any meritorious claim and the prisoner failed to respond with any claims he 
believed his counsel overlooked.  566 U.S. at 6, 18.  Even though the prisoner failed to 
respond, the Supreme Court remanded the case to determine whether his collateral 
counsel was ineffective for conceding any claim of ineffective assistance at trial.  Id. at 
18.  The facts here are similar to those in Martinez: Mack’s PCRA counsel filed a no-
merit letter and Mack failed to raise in his pro se response his claim of ineffective 
assistance of plea counsel.  Even though Mack responded but failed to raise that claim, 
Martinez may still excuse the default if Mack’s PCRA counsel was ineffective for filing a 
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no-merit letter and not raising Mack’s ineffective assistance claim regarding plea counsel.  
Thus, the District Court erred by not applying Martinez to determine whether the default 
may be excused. 
Our decision in Bey was announced after the District Court dismissed Mack’s 
habeas petition but provides further support for our decision.  856 F.3d at 237.  We stated 
there that, in Pennsylvania, PCRA counsel has the responsibility to raise any claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 243.  Because that responsibility rests with PCRA 
counsel, we applied Martinez to determine whether the default may be excused.  Id. at 
243-44.  The District Court here failed to appreciate that PCRA counsel, not Mack, had 
the responsibility to raise the claim.  Thus, it was error not to conduct the Martinez 
analysis. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s order dismissing 
Mack’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and remand with instructions for the Court to 
conduct the analysis that Martinez requires – that is, to determine whether Mack can 
establish that (a) the default was caused by ineffective assistance of his PCRA counsel or 
the absence of counsel, (b) in an initial-review collateral proceeding, and (c) the 
underlying claim of plea counsel ineffectiveness is substantial.  Cox, 757 F.3d at 119. 
